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Semiotics and the Something
A Pragmatist Perspective on the Debate on Realism
Rossella Fabbrichesi
“I think that the almost obsessive subject of my
work has been that of how we come to know the
world.” 
(Eco 2004: 193)
 
1. Being and Reality
1 Since 2010 the philosophical arena has seen the rise of a new battle – maybe, the most
ancient battle that philosophy has fought. It is the problem of the status of reality. More
precisely, the aim of this battle has been to defend the Existence of Reality against those
who have argued that “reality” is only a mode of speech and interpretation. As is known,
many important philosophers, both Italian and foreign, have taken part in this battle, and
obviously agreements, negotiations, or even unbridgeable differences have emerged. It is
also known that it is Maurizio Ferraris who started the debate (first and foremost against
himself, namely, against the interpreter of Nietzsche deeply rooted in the hermeneutic
and Vattimian faith1), with various volumes and articles, and then with the pugnacious
Manifesto of New Realism.2 My intention in this paper is to enter this debate in order to
raise a different sort of question, not whether reality exists or doesn’t exist – a strongly
commonsensical and therefore not deeply philosophical position – but what we do, what
we want to obtain, when we use terms such as ‘real,’ ‘objective,’ ‘given.’ In pragmatist
fashion, I  would like to ask the same question that Peirce asked 150 years ago: what
effects does our belief in reality produce? As Peirce wrote, when we deem something
‘real,’  we mean that  that  something can cause a  certain belief  capable  of  producing
relevant practical effects.3 Real things lead me to do certain actions and not others. Thus,
the problem of realism must be addressed accordingly: what are the conceivably practical
habits and behaviors that the belief in the existence of reality produces? The problem is
then to distinguish true beliefs (that is, those beliefs that remove doubt and allow me to
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act with confidence) from false beliefs (that is, purely fictional beliefs with no effective
grasp on the world)4.
2 There is no need here to rehash the terms of this well-known debate. Rather, my main
purpose  here  is  to  sketch Umberto  Eco’s  position,  which stands  out  as  usual  for  its
argumentative  subtlety  and  composure.  My  aim  is,  then,  to  try  to  reconstruct  the
pragmatist matrix of Eco’s thought and to show how realism could benefit from being put
in dialogue with a different philosophical framework, namely, from being reinterpreted
in light of the pragmatism of Peirce and of Eco’s reception of that tradition. At the same
time, I will highlight some elements that Eco has overlooked, due to his focus on Peirce’s
semiotics  and  not  on  his  broader  philosophical,  phenomenological,  and  pragmaticist
philosophy.
3 Ferraris aptly describes his ‘new realism’ in the following words: there are unamendable
facts that deserve respect and deference.5 These facts are not interpretable, they simply
are.  His  polemical  target  is  not  idealism,  but  the postmodern constructionism whose
noble and long genealogy goes from Kant to Goodman and Foucault through Nietzsche
and pragmatism.6 As Eco will rightly point out, the fuse arming the realist fire is the will
to turn to ashes the Nietzschean statement, “There are no facts, only interpretations,”7 a
view that Ferraris himself explained and endorsed at one point.8 
4 But let’s focus on Eco. It is important to stress that Eco came to an original philosophical
position already at the end of the 1990s in his Kant and the Platypus, a position neither
obsequious to the hermeneutical theses prevalent at that time, nor naively realist. Eco
proved to be not only the father of Italian semiotics but also a philosopher in his own
right, one of the most lucid and original of our recent history. The first chapter, entitled
“On Being,” is a treatise on metaphysics, ontology, gnoseology, and also philosophical
semiotics – or interpretative semiotics, as he preferred to say following the suggestions of
some  of  his  interpreters.9 This  treatise,  which  could  be  rightly  read  as  a  refined
interpretation of  Aristotle,  Nietzsche,  Heidegger,  Peirce  and the  Medievals,  curiously
hasn’t  been read or quoted by professional  philosophers,  maybe because professional
philosophers might be sometimes a somewhat self-referential caste slow at welcoming
outsiders. Nevertheless, the first chapter is full of considerations capable of putting in
their corner even the wariest of philosophers – above all, his friend Gianni Vattimo, who
is gracefully demolished in these pages. I will try now to be up to the problems that were
addressed there.
5 As Heidegger put at the beginning of Being and Time,  being is the oldest philosophical
problem and at the same time the most neglected. While things are different, they all are,
as Aristotle already remarked. Thus,  Aristotle continued, being is said in many ways.
Leibniz  would  claim  later,  followed  by  Heidegger,  that  the  most  radical  question
philosophy has ever asked is “Why is there being rather than nothing?”
6 Eco begins from here and shows with keen lucidity and supreme reasonableness that
actually this is not a radical question because, even if we wanted to assume that the verb
being is involved in every proposition (but Sapir and Whorf have already casted some
doubt on this, by proving that the languages of some ‘primitive’ peoples do not use the
copula or terministic references10) it remains true that it cannot be dialectically opposed
to anything else, to the nothing, because it designates ‘what there is,’ the untrascendable
horizon that allows us to speak of anything, the ‘that,’ as James used to say, and not the
‘what’ that qualifies it with different attributions and qualifications. “Therefore, there is
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being because we can pose the question of being, and thus being comes before every
question, and therefore before any answer and every definition.” (Eco 2000: 19). It is a
term  with  “an  unlimited extension and  a  null  intension”  (ibid.:  10;  original  emphasis).
Spinoza, appropriately quoted by Eco a few pages later, wrote: Substance (which is the
modern name for being) is causa sui, is infinite, incircumscribable, its essence implies its
existence, it is self-explanatory, it is expression of all its modes etc. Eco translates in the
following way: “being is its own fundamental principle.” (Ibid.: 20). In it we speak, even
though we can never speak about it thematically, simply because we are expressions of it,
internal modalities,  pure affections,  as Spinoza has taught once for all.  Being (which,
contrary to Heidegger’s conviction, doesn’t throw in the world, which does not reveal or
hide, which is neither clearing or concealing, but is rather the “amniotic fluid” (ibid.: 18)
in which life, every life, is made possible) can be identified with the beings (or entities). In
Spinozian terms: the substance is nothing else than its modes, and it is possible to say
“that it is a totality that includes not only what is physically around us but also what is
below, or inside, or around or before or after, and founds it and/or justifies it” (ibid.: 11).
This is a crucial passage, perfect for what I am trying to claim here: being surrounds and
penetrates us, it is natura naturans and natura naturata, foundational and founded at the
same time, it is inscribed and circumscribed,11 it is not more outside of us than inside of
us, because every thing is, despite the differences (in a certain way, it is even if it is not).
We should not think then, as Descartes did, that we are ‘spiritual’ substances in a world of
‘material’ substances; rather, we are the (only, indivisible, infinite) Substance, as Spinoza
put it.  Being doesn’t lie before us waiting to be known; it is rather the inexhaustible
source of all possible intelligibility and attribution. We should be careful, then, as Eco in
Ch. 1.3 reminds us, that the problem of being cannot be reduced to that of the external
world; the latter is a topic constructed by metaphysical reason, the former concerns the
primary evidence (iconic-perceptive for Eco) that something is given. If I am in the world,
the world is not perceived immediately as external, present in front of me, in front of an
‘I’ understood as an interiority (think about the infant, who knows nothing about these
distinctions); if I am in the world, I am the world, tout court. The I is not a spectator who
looks at the world out there as from a window, Calvino wrote: “the I is world that looks at
the world.”12 “All this should immediately make clear that the problem of being cannot be
reduced to the problem of the reality of the world. Whether what we call the outside
World, or the Universe, is or is not, or whether it is the effect of a malign spirit, does not
in any way affect the primary evidence that there is ‘something’ somewhere.” (Eco 2000:
18).
 
2. The Sign, the Immediate Object, and the Dynamical
Object
7 My problem is  the  following:  why should we call  this  pure  That,  this  pure  Being,  a
‘Something’ (Eco 2000: 12)? Already in the choice of the word one highlights the what
(some-thing) that inhabits it: the something expresses the alleged what of the ‘being,’ not
the pure that of its being there. It is true that Eco explains that in order to speak of the
being we have to bend it to our linguistic categories, that being becomes a philosophical
problem the moment that we speak of it (thus the ecstatic evidence of the being is lived as
a pure experience, but is inevitably said with the words of human discourse, in which the
Semiotics and the Something
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
3
original ‘purity’ is lost). Thus, that being is Something is highlighted in Ch. 1.1 through
Leibniz’s famous statement (in the form: ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’). 
8 What I  would call  the kenosis,  the lowering,  of  being,  continues in the same chapter
through the identification of being with Peirce’s Dynamical Object (the “real” object that
is  “causation” or  “influence” (EP2:  409)  of  the signifying character  of  the sign)  and,
finally, with that Something that Eco ironically defines “Something-that-sets-to-kicking-
us”  (Eco  2000:  14),  where  the  use  of  Heidegger’s  esoteric  hyphened  writing  style  is
supposed to win the philosophers’ attention. The Something says “Talk!” to us – or “Talk
about me!” or again, “Take me into consideration!” (Ibid.); it is, above all, a problem of
perceptual evidence, and it is for this reason that the book is devoted in large part to the
problem of perception and iconism. The Dynamical Object is thus what compels us to
begin the process of semiosis, it is the Something that demands to be given a place in our
language.
9 Why is this interpretation not fully satisfactory? What in it seems to make the beautiful
insights of the outset somewhat weaker? I believe the answer is the following: here the
Being,  understood as  Something,  is  understood after  the  form of  a  Thing,  above  all
External – a thing that activates some indexes, some reactions, some ‘primary attentions’
–  an  external  objectuality  that  produces,  determines,  accelerates  the  engine  of  the
production of signs. In other words, we have already passed the phenomenological level
in which we encounter what is given the way it is given: we are at the level of the Ego vs
Non-Ego, as Peirce would say.13 Perhaps it is true that Peirce, in a certain phase of his life,
considered the process of production of semiosis as generated by a real “object,” external
to  the  architecture  of  signs,  according to  the  canonical  model  sketched by Massimo
Bonfantini in his Introduction to Semiotica (Bonfantini 1980: xxxv). However, as I will try
to show, the distinction between Immediate Object and Dynamical Object is internal to
the play among the categories and was not modeled after the Kantian phenomenon-
noumenon framework: for Peirce, reality as a whole, or being as incircumscribable and
all-penetrating event,  cannot be grasped,  perceived,  or given if  not as a sign.  A sign
produced  in  relation  to  an  object,  to  a  Something,  following  Eco,  but  through  the
mediation of an Interpretant, which remains, in my view, the real engine of the unlimited
semiosis. There is no doubt that Peirce writes explicitly that the sign is determined by an
Object and determines an Interpretant (CP 8.343), which seems to suggest that there is a
process according to which the sign is always produced by a terminus a quo that resides
within the horizon of experience. Yet, it is also true that in On a New List of Categories (EP1:
1-10)  the interpreting representation is  the one that  mediates  and at  the same time
establishes the possibility of referring to mediated terms, so that without its intervention
there  would be no “unification”  of  the  “manifold  of  Substance  itself”  (to  follow the
terminology of  the New List),  or no “significance” by putting “together  the different
subjects  as the sign represents them as related” (CP 8.179).  It  is  the triadic relation,
activated by the interpreting sign, which makes visible a Dynamical and objectual pole. It
is in the semiotic circle that the distances between sign and object become evident, while
being always recomposed through the mediation of the interpretant. 
10 By remaining faithful to the pragmatic maxim, we can say that the meaning of a sign lies
in its appeal to an Interpretant, especially a Final Logical Interpretant, that is, a habit.
The meaning of a sign resides in its conceivable effects, in its being directed to a terminus
ad quem, which can be conceived, as we have seen, as a Dynamical Object, understood
however as what is gained at the end of a potentially limitless semiotic process (CP 8.183),
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and not  as  something that  is  supposed to be in front  of  me waiting to be faithfully
mirrored.14 The object is the “cause” of the sign only insofar as it is found as the purport
(CP 5.429, 5.412) of the same sign, which has the form of a pragmatic habit of response.
We could say that the immediate object is dynamized at each semiotic-interpretative step,
tracing a parabolic trajectory (from the cause to the purport and back) which keeps
moving the interpretative horizon more and more beyond the limits already achieved.
11 My intention here is to play Eco against himself: in his early writings, the referent – in
complete agreement with Peirce’s thought (which is different from de Saussure precisely
on this point!) – was considered of little or no importance for semiotics, since a semiotics
worthy of its name should have not occupied itself with problems such as the status of
reality, external things, facts, or givens, considered as extra interpretationem. For things,
facts, givens, were to be considered only as signs internal to the linguistic and semantic
practices that denoted and connoted them now in a certain way, now in another. The first
paragraph of the first chapter of Le forme del contenuto is entitled accordingly “L’equivoco
del referente (The Misunderstanding of the Referent)” (Eco 1971) and warned against the
confusion, caused in part by Frege’s analyses, between meaning and referent. If a semiotic
science existed,  it  would have been to deal  with the signs  independently  from their
relations to objects (ibid.: 31).
12 We can certainly say that Eco’s thought,  just like Peirce’s,  has evolved from an early
semiotic-hermeneutical  and  definitely  conventionalist  phase  (I  don’t  want  to  call  it
idealistic, as Maldonado said in the debate on iconism, see Fabbrichesi (2017: 312-3); Eco
would have been offended by this, but not Peirce, given that he spoke of idealrealism), to
a more realistic phase. Nevertheless, the problem remains: either we consider being as a
primum that cannot be articulated,  which not only surrounds and fills  with awe our
outlook on the creation, but also inhabits it  from inside and feeds its need to find a
meaning, or we consider it as a force that resists our attention, that compels it in this or
that  direction,  which  says  many  ‘No’s’,  and  highlights  its  own  difference  from  our
interpretations (above all the wrong ones). In other words, either being is the whole, or it
is  that  part  of  the being there that is  before me while I  examine it.  But being,  in a
perspective such as Peirce’s, is not divided in distinct realities, it is never a difference: on
the contrary it is diffused continuity, a synechistic substance that, like Spinoza’s, doesn’t
imply dualisms between matter and mind, inside and outside, yes and no. The problem is
not whether to admit the referent in semiotics; rather, the problem is to recognize the
philosophical  and metaphysical  dimension of  semiotics.  As  Paolucci  reminds us,  “the
notion of habit founded in synechism transcends all distinction between the dynamic
object and the immediate object, between mind and matter, between the semiotic order
of ideas and the ontological  order of things,  thereby invalidating their differences in
nature” (Paolucci 2017a: 262).15 “Ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio
rerum” (Spinoza, Ethica, II, Prop. 7).
13 The ‘idem’ brings us back to iconicity, which plays a fundamental role in Eco’s book on
Kant and in his entire production. We could say that being, seen from this perspective, is
the place of a primary iconism, of a correspondence already perfectly realized, as we read
in Eco (2000, Ch. 2.8.2). Every being reveals a “protosemiotic disposition” to encounter,
even a sort of Medieval adaequatio, an aptitude to adapting not to what is external to it,
but what is its own.16 Perceptual processes and primary acknowledgment processes are
rooted in this disposition to the encounter with the world – what Peirce defined as a form
of tropism toward truth, or lume naturale – and are certainly related to the synechistic
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philosophy of the late Peirce. I have dealt with the problem of iconism in my contribution
to the Library volume (Fabbrichesi 2017). I refer to this work only because Eco responded
to what I wrote there by noting that before 2017 “I had not connected my idea of primary
iconism to that of negative realism, or at least it had not seemed as clear as it does to me
now” (Eco 2017: 329).17
 
3. Negative Realism and Pragmatism
14 Let’s follow now this important direction on the path of realism, what Eco has called
“negative realism.” If we go back to Kant and the Platypus, we find a central section in Ch. 1
entitled “Semiotics and the Something.” Contrary to the trenchant statements of Le forme
del contenuto, the referent now seems to acquire a fundamental role also for semiotics.
What is that something that compels us to produce signs? What is the terminus a quo that
forces us to enter the world as linguistic and symbolic animals? While semiotics deals
primarily with the terminus ad quem that we cast in all the possible encyclopedic modes of
our speech, it  cannot nevertheless overlook, as Eco reminds us,  the inquiry into that
something that awakens our attention by imposing itself as a novelty and an exception to
our consolidated systems of reference. However, again, didn’t we say that being cannot be
articulated, that it has unlimited extension and no intension, and that it can be identified
with “what is below, or inside, or around or before or after, and founds it and/or justifies
it” (Eco 2000: 11)?
15 Maybe it does not make much sense to distinguish something a quo and something ad
quem outside the semiotic chain, or to separate the strike that sparks the semiotic process
from the construct of its signifying referent. In fact, these aspects are distinct, but only at
the phenomenological and not at the ontological level.18 The process of semiosis is an
unlimited process, which has no beginning (a quo) nor end (ad quem), and in which every
interpretant becomes in turn a new sign within a new semiotic chain that moves the
reference-object always a little further on – “this tri-relative influence not being in any
way  resolvable  into  action  between pairs”  (CP  5.484).  Maybe  when we  speak  of  the
Something that kicks us we are putting ourselves at a different level from that of the pure
Being (which for Peirce is pure Firstness), or of pure Semiosis (Thirdness); maybe here we
are dealing with Secondness (the Non Ego opposed to the Ego, cf. 5.57). Only in this light, I
submit,  what  follows  acquires  a  more  complete  sense  and  remains  more  faithful  to
Peirce’s thought, so many times invoked by Eco.
16 Always  in  the  same  chapter  we  read:  “A  Dynamical  Object  drives  us  to  produce  a
representamen,  in  a  quasi-mind  this  produces  an  Immediate  Object,  which  in  turn  is
translatable into a potentially infinite series of interpretants and sometimes, through the
habit formed in the course of the interpretative process, we come back to the Dynamical
Object, and we make something of it.” (Eco 2000: 13; my emphasis). This idea is elaborated
in connection with negative, or “minimal,” realism, as Eco writes in his late works and
eventually  in  the  intellectual  autobiography  contained  in  the  Library  posthumous
volume: “I also think that my notion of a minimal realism can be translated in terms of
the philosophy of Peirce. As I have already said, for Peirce every one of our inquiries, as
well as our perceptual explorations of the surrounding world, is elicited by a dynamical
object. We do not know it if not through immediate objects, which are signs and their
interpretants,  and  the  series  of  interpretants  never  stops,  producing  a  process  of
unlimited semiosis. However, by producing these interpretants we grow a habit, that is to
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say,  an ability  to  act  upon surrounding reality,  and the proof  that  a  given series  of
interpretants works is given by the fact that through our habit we can modify reality. If
we do not succeed in this enterprise, the very possibility of a failure means that there is
something  controlling  and  limiting  our  interpretations.”  (Eco  2017:  54;  original
emphasis). Even more clearly, Eco writes: “The process of unlimited semiosis stops when
we produce a  habit,  that  allows us  to  come to  grips with the reality  (the  Dynamical
Object).”19 (Eco 2017: 46). The second emphasis is mine (but the first is Eco’s!): the main
problem is that of prehension between thought and reality, as Whitehead used to say.
17 So, it is with respect to pragmatism especially that we find a promising line of research for
better explaining Eco’s theory of negative realism.
 
4. Being and Doing
18 I try to formulate the issue in the following way, by emphasizing the quotations that I
have just read: Being is not a substantial Something; it is neither static nor “external.”
Being coincides with doing,20 as Eco just told us in his quotation from Kant and the Platypus
(ibid.: 13). The transaction with the world does not produce a belief in ‘things,’ obtained
through propositional  representations;  rather,  it  enables certain possible actions in a
certain context of experience. Peirce already explained this in a crystal-clear passage on
the logic of propositions: “The peculiarity of this definition [of the word lithium] is that it
tells you what the word lithium denotes by prescribing what you have to do in order to
gain a perceptual acquaintance with the object of the word.” (CP 2.330). It turns out, then,
that the habit is the only ‘real’  (Dynamical!)  thing with which we have to deal.  “The
definition of belief [by Bain] is that upon which a man is prepared to act” (EP2: 399),
wrote  Peirce,  by  adding  that  pragmatism  is  scarce  more  than  a  corollary  to  that
definition. Belief and action, thought and fact have a very tight connection, characterized
by continuity and simultaneous identity: practice is thus the primum,  the form of life
within  which  we  speak,  act,  and  gain  certainties.  Objects  and  subjects,  contexts  of
knowledge and languages are given only within these practices. The Interpretant is for
Peirce  the  pragmatic  habit  of  response  that  through  its  use  guarantees  the
comprehension of a meaning, or the truth and reality of what we know.
19 Note that I am not claiming that real objects do not exist; rather, I am saying that they
appear in my perceptual field and awaken my attention only in reference to their possible
(and conceivable) use.  I  want to repeat here the famous example of the psychologist
Lurija, quoted by Ong in a famous book.21 The Soviet scientist asked a farmer about the
distinction between log,  ax,  and saw.  The farmer,  after struggling to understand the
question, responded that they were actually one and the same thing because they were
involved and used in a single action: “The saw will saw the log and hatcher will chop it.”
Objects  are  never  given  apart  from the  practices  in  which  they  are  involved.22 Eco
reminds us of this point when he repeats Richard Rorty’s example of the screwdriver, also
contained in his intellectual autobiography. Richard Rorty, in a public talk at Cambridge
University, denied that the use made of a screwdriver to tighten screws is imposed by the
object itself since we can also use it to open a package. Eco objected that “a screwdriver
can also serve to open a package but it is inadvisable to use it for rummaging about your
ear […] There is something in the conformation both of my body and of the screwdriver
[again  the  adaequatio as  foundation  of  primary  iconism!]  that  prevents  me  from
interpreting the latter at my whim.” (Eco 2017: 48). Shortly after, he claims that even the
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most radical of Nietzscheans will never deny the physical presence of a table before me,
even though he will add maybe that it becomes object of knowledge and speech only if it
is interpreted as desk, as object of autoptic dissection, as ensemble of atoms, and so on.
He also notes: “I agree but my objection is that this table cannot be interpreted as a
vehicle that can be used to travel from Manhattan to Poughkeepsie.” (Eco 2017: 48-9).
20 This is where the topic of negative realism becomes crucial.  “Getting back to Rorty’s
screwdriver, my objection did not deny that it can permit manifold interpretations […]. A
screwdriver responds positively (so to speak) to many of my possible interpretations but in
certain cases it says ‘no.’ This sort of refusal opposed by the objects of our world is the
basis of  my prudent idea of negative realism.” (Eco 2017:  51;  emphasis mine).  I  have
underlined  the  pragmatic  word  “respond”:  the  screwdriver  has  to  respond  to  my
solicitations and my conduct has to be practical and effective in relation to my purport. As I
said earlier,  my practice with that  tool  has  to be translated into a  habit,  capable of
optimizing  and  changing  my  transaction  with  the  world.  Eco’s  realism  is  clearly  a
pragmatic form of realism.
21 I  go back now for  a  moment  to Kant  and the  Platypus,  where the incipient  theses  of
negative realism appeared in the claim that there are some lines of resistance of being, a
claim that is amply rehashed, confirmed, and developed in the final autobiography (Eco
2017: ch. xv). Eco’s position on this point is well known: being has a hard core, understood
not as an inner kernel that at some point, after much digging, we will manage to unveil,
but  as  a  fault  line,  as  possibility  of  flow,  as  in  the grain of  wood or  marble.  It  is  a
disposition to be read or framed in a certain way, a mening, as Hjelmslev says, rather than
a  meaning;  a  sense,  for  sure,  but  more  understood  as  a  direction  that  cannot  be
overlooked when we try to understand the Something. Eco reminds us that Hjelmslev
accepted the word ‘purport’ as the English translation of his mening. This is not surprising
for us, given the fundamental role that the idea of purport plays in Peirce’s pragmatist
thought:  the  pragmatic  maxim was  in  fact  meant  to  exactly  clarify  a  sign’s  rational
purport.23 The lines of resistance are lines of propensity, as Eco adds in a work quoted by
Paolucci.24 Maybe being, Eco remarks, does not have one sense, but many; maybe it does
not imply compulsory directions, but certainly certain directions remain dead ends (Eco
2000: 53). Being says very clear No!s. A screwdriver resists being used as a Q-tip. A table
refuses to roll  on the highway to Milano.  “Let us try rather to identify some lines  of
resistance, perhaps mobile, vagabond, that cause the discourse to seize up […] That being
places limits on the discourse through which we establish ourselves in its horizon is not
the negation of hermeneutic activity: instead it is the condition for it.” (Eco 2000: 50;
original emphasis). 
22 Here, being is not the incircumscribable “that,” but it is something like a hindrance for
thought  and  language,  a  schism –  Peirce  used  to  speak  of  a  “Non-Ego,  the  strange
intruder, in his abrupt entrance” (CP 5.53), which suddenly stretches apart from the Ego,
which is simply the expected idea suddenly broken off, something that appears in place of
the expected object. However, as I mentioned earlier, Eco is always very subtle and is
aware of  this  change of  direction.  Did I  say earlier  that  being always presents  itself
positively and that the nothing is the effect of language, while now I state that being
opposes clear No!s to our thought and conduct? Not quite: a closed door is a No! for those
who want to force it, but it can also be a Yes for those who want to keep some privacy or
protect from an intruder. “To us who capriciously would like to live on, death appears as
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a limit, but for the organism it arrives when things go exactly as they must.” (Eco 2000:
56). 
23 Being  never  tells  us  no,  except  in  our  metaphor.  “Simply,  faced  with  a  demanding
question on our part, it does not give the answer we would have wished.” (Ibid.) It is
always a problem of expectation and surprise (Brioschi 2015), of practices that are more or
less confirmed by experience, of regularity or discontinuity in interpretation. It is worth
noting that in his writings on synechism Peirce warns us that it is always based on a
discontinuity that we can grasp the underlying continuity (cf. CP 6.168).
 
5. Reality as what Awaits in the Future
24 We are now pushed back to the problem of practice. Reality as objectivity does not exist in
itself independently from the framework based on which, for instance, ‘real’ is a good and
productive idea – this is so more for the scientist than for the shaman. Peirce himself
reminds  us  that  the  term  and  concept  of  being  (ens) is  the  result  of  a  strenuous
metaphysical work over the centuries. Real “is a conception which we must first have had
when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected
ourselves” (EP1:  52).  And he adds:  it  is  that “ens” that will  conform to the object of
research in the long run, the truth of public inquiry, which doesn’t belong to the private
idiosyncrasy. “The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning
would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and
you.” (Ibid.). Not independent, however, from thought “in general,” from “public” truth,
or from the truth of the community that makes a certain belief true.
25 Don’t we have here, however, a twofold theory of the real, namely, real understood as
what will be confirmed as terminus ad quem and real as what says no to our incorrect
interpretations (or terminus a quo)? We have already reached a similar impasse when
discussing Eco’s  account of  the classification of  objects in Peirce’s  semiotics.  Now, in
conclusion, we have the opportunity to clarify these seeming contradictions by appealing
to Peirce’s phaneroscopy and by stressing again that the fault line is such only from a
phenomenological, not ontological, point of view.
26 The study of the phaneron, or phenomenon of experience (which is not the same thing as
the  study  of  ‘reality,’  as  any  philosopher  knows  and  as  Peirce  underlines;  it  is  the
immediate evidence we experience every day of our life25) leads us to find in it three
aspects that, although different, are absolutely indistinct. Let’s take the example of an
earthquake that bursts into my life unexpectedly,  an example of  hard,  unamendable,
brute reality, not an interpretation! It happens as pure sensation; it is a quality without
relations,  pure experience, neither subjective nor objective,  an original and emerging
Firstness (I am thrown around and I can’t even ask what is going on); however, it also
happens as  shock,  constraint,  Secondness (here’s  the intrusion of  brute reality:  I  am
bleeding, I hurt) and as laborious cognitive mediation (I understand what is going on: it is
that cataclysmic event usually called ‘earthquake.’ They have told me about it multiple
times, but now I’m living it on my skin, poor me!). It is then a problem of ‘prehension’ of
what  happens  in  terms  of  complex  categories,  in  which  First  is  not  prior  from the
chronological point of view, but from the point of view of the structure of experience –
experience in its immediate and spontaneous dimension. Here Peirce presents to us a
semiotics built upon phenomenology, not a realist/empiricist ontology. For this reason,
when I refer to the existence of “real facts” (it was a real earthquake!),  I  am already
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working at a different level, the level in which I reflect upon the experience I have had
and give a name to it. I have undergone the shock against the events, against the Non-
Ego, as Peirce says; let’s call it simply “existence,” an affair of blind force, a Dynamical
reaction (cf. CP 1.329). But the encounter with “reality” has a different nature: it has an
interpretative, segnic, relational nature.26
27 Thus, Peirce distinguishes being as Secondness from being as Thirdness (besides pure and
unrelated Firstness). Existence is the brute fact that resists (CP 1.431), it is the acting and
being acted upon by something that is forced upon us: this is the meaning of the word
“real,” Peirce writes in What is a Sign? (EP 2: 4-5).27 But the real is not only what exists in
the  mode of  brute  opposition,  which tells  us  blunt  No!s  where  we would like  to  be
welcomed,  where  we  have  to  reconfigure  our  conceptual  orders  to  sustain  the
interruption of the “strange intruder” that generates surprise and bewilderment. Real is
also “the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate” (EP1:
139), “the normal product of mental action and not [the] incognizable cause of it” (EP1:
91), it is the cause of belief with all its sensible effects (EP1: 137); in one expression – these
are  all  quotations  from Peirce’s  1868-1878  writings  on  his  cognitive  and  pragmatist
semiotics – reality “is an event indefinitely future” (EP1: 64). We could say that Peirce
distinguishes brute existence hic et nunc from the persistence of the habits – but both these
experiences  live  together,  are  insistent,  in  one  and  the  same  phaneron or  crystal  of
apparent visibility.28 
28 We find in these reflections  the play between Immediate  and Dynamical  Object  that
accompanies the semiotic considerations of the late Peirce: if the Dynamical Object is the
real object as purely existent, as the cause of the semiotic process, the Immediate Object
is the real object as determined through precise semiotic forms. Nevertheless, there is no
way to grasp the former apart from the mediation of the latter. Reversely, as Eco observes, the
latter can be constituted by semiotic interpretations so crystalized to become substantial
“inveterate  habits”  (CP  6.613).  In  this  sense,  it  appears  as  something  ‘given’  and
dynamically elusive. This datum may well be a result (of another interpretation) but will,
in any case, be a present extra-interpretationem event. “Precisely because one supports a
theory  of  interpretation,  it  is  necessary  to  admit  that  something  is  given to  be
interpreted.” (Eco 2007: 463; original emphasis). In a synechistic perspective, then, there
is a circularity between interpretations and givens; in a phenomenological perspective it
is possible to distinguish events (not facts) of different nature, which however remain
different aspects of the same whole of experience.
29 Let me now move to the last step of my argument. In trying to find a precise definition of
the term ‘real’  Peirce uses a terminology that we could explain in the following way:
reality is a habit of  expectation,  capable of being dynamically organized and of placing
one’s meaning into the indefinite future. This means that the real is what life has forced
me to recognize, but also what my habits of expectation lead me to hope will happen in the
long run. In a 1904 letter to James (CP 8.284, see also 8.330), Peirce remarks that according
to “pragmatic idealism” (namely, the true idealism), “reality consists in the future” (ibid.).
I define this process, he says, “mellonization,” from the Greek mellon: the being about to
do, to be, or to suffer. “I mean that operation of logic by which what is conceived as
having been is conceived as repeated or extended indefinitely into what always will be (or
what will some day be…).” (Ibid.). “Therefore to say that it is the world of thought that it is
real is, when properly understood, to assert emphatically the reality of the public world of
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the indefinite  future as against our past opinions of what it  was to be.” (CP 8.284;  my
emphasis). 
30 Those who are  familiar  with pragmatism will  recognize  here  the  same terms of  the
pragmatic maxim, or rather of pragmaticism: what is the meaning of a belief? It is to
produce “a tendency – the habit –  actually to behave in a similar way under similar
circumstances in the future” (CP 5.487; original emphasis).29 I also like to think about it
(always relying upon the possible meaning of the word expectation) as a habit of hope: the
hope that the community of Interpreters will continue to reasonably interpret the given
event as ‘real’  above any assignable limit.  In this sense,  and only in this sense – my
comment has nothing polemical against Ferraris’s Manifesto, but wants rather to integrate
it – we owe “respect” to this class of ‘facts’ because they ‘charitably’ offer themselves to
our interpretation and because we can nourish the faith that our interpretation can be
true (cf. CP 2.655).
31 Peirce would agree with Eco entirely on the ideas of surprise and resistance as bases for
our experience of being. However, Peirce would invite Eco to refrain from separating the
real as Secondness from the real as Thirdness, the real as surprise (CP 5.51ff) from the
real as expectation (CP 5.53-57).30 They are two different qualities of experience, which
lead to the formation of habits, namely, two different but interconnected ways of being
affected; nevertheless, both are and the process of knowing is constituted in the constant
transit  from one  to  the  other  (together  with  Firstness,  cf.  CP  5.91).  Experience  is  a
continuity  in  actu while  our  thought  is  used  to  working  with  Cartesian  categories:
Cartesian thought works as the ax and separates, distinguishes, univocally defines reality
and thought,  external  and internal,  sign and object.  The weakness  of  the  debate  on
realism lies  in  its  assumption.  We  should  not  refer  to  the  ‘external  reality’  as  to  a
fundamentum inconcussum, but rather to our daily experience. As Peirce explains, in this
light, acts, and not facts (opposed to interpretations), would appear as real; not the facts,
but the habits, the practices connoting the power to act of every being in the universe, as
Spinoza would put it.31 The Something is complex and categorially diversified; to lose one
of its qualities is to lose the totality of the phenomenon of experience.
32 As the farmer observed by Lurija reminds us, log, saw, and ax (or, in Eco’s terms, being,
something, and sign) are not different events: they are the same event, offered in its
different experiential tones. Therefore, we shouldn’t trust the rigid distinction that our
language projects on ‘real’ things, distinguishing the bearer of the name from its actions;
rather, we should conceive of our commerce with the world through the lenses of the
unity of our practices and of the context of acknowledgement in which their ‘reality’ is
shaped and structured, ready to start the journey toward the future of infinite semiosis. 
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NOTES
1. Cf. the substantial study Storia dell’Ermeneutica (1988) and his important edition (with P. Kobau)
of F. Nietzsche, La volontà di potenza (2005). 
2. Cf. Ferraris 2014.
3. C.S. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in EP1: 136-8.
4. See, for a pragmatist interpretation of the theme of realism, Calcaterra 2015 and Maddalena
2017.
5. Cf. Ferraris 2014, Ch. 1 and Ferraris 2011.
6. As Ferraris makes clear in the Manifesto (2014: 4-15), his polemical targets are the postmodern
ironization, the desublimation, or emphasis on the desire and the drives of the body, and above
all the de-objectification leading to the skeptical and relativistic doubt toward any project of
ontological  foundation.  Some  consequences  are  the  identification  of  being  and  knowledge,
namely,  the  confusion  between  ontology  and  epistemology,  and  the  rejection  of  the  non-
negotiability of that aspect of reality ‘out there’ that seems to stubbornly constrain our action. 
7. Cf. Nietzsche 2005, aphorism 481. On this see Eco (2017: 46).
8. Ferraris edited an edition of The Will to Power, from which Nietzsche’s statement is taken (cf.
n.1).
9. Paolucci 2017b has amply underlined this aspect. 
10. Cf. Whorf 1964. 
11. The reference is to Nicholas of Cusa’s polygon, so dear to Eco. Cf. La soglia e l’infinito (Eco 2007:
484).
12. Cf. Calvino (1983: 116).
13. Cf.  CP  1.332.  The  fact  that  Peirce  speaks  of  two  types  of  object  has  to  do  with  the
determination of Secondness, in Peircean phaneroscopic terms. Immediate Object is “the Object
as represented in the sign,” the idea (CP 8.314), what we know about the sign through “collateral
experience” (ibid.); the Dynamical Object is instead defined as the Real Object. With respect to the
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latter, Peirce clarifies that “perhaps the object is altogether fictive, I must choose a different
term”; as a consequence, Peirce will refer to it as “something which, from the nature of things,
the  Sign  cannot express,  which  it  can  only  indicate and  leave  the  interpreter  to  find  out  by
collateral experience” (ibid. ; original emphasis), or, following the definition of ‘real’ present in
the 1878 writings, “the Object in such relations as unlimited and final study would show it to be”
(8.183). 
14. Maybe the problem can be framed as Eco does (2017: 48; original emphasis): “I do not believe
that even the most fundamentalist followers of weak thought really think that there are no facts
at all since to make an interpretation one must have something to interpret, and if the series of
interpretations has no final terminus ad quem it must have at least a terminus a quo – a starting
point that, however matters stand, we can call a fact.”
15. In this sense, Eco distances himself from Peirce, as the authors explains a few lines above:
“This is the original Peircean Kantianism of Umberto Eco: interpretations and signs show the
world in a certain respect but the world continues to oppose its form to the semiotic form of
determination, imposing limits on that which can be said on a semiotic level (negative realism).”
(Ibid.:  260).  I  thank  Claudio  Paolucci  for  bringing  to  my  attention  this  point  in  a  private
conversation.
16. This  is  in  line  with  Peirce,  for  whom iconicity  predisposes  to  the  encounter  and to  the
adequation what emerges from the same ground (cf. CP 2.278). That is to say, it is not the case
that there is a field of various events and then the appearance of a likeness between two of them.
What is given primarily is the relation, the internal relation, namely, the iconic relation; it is the
ground that allows an other (a correlate, an object) to emerge, which in particular respect, order
or quality shows itself to be the same (a sign for likeness).  As a pure possibility of reference,
iconicity  is  given  as  a  relation  that  is  neither  comparative  (namely,  Secondness)  nor
interpretational (Thirdness);  it  does not specify concrete objects but paves the way for their
individuation and constitution. It is not the sign that resembles the object ‘out there’; it is the
object  that  announces  itself  and  becomes  meaningful  in  the  relations  allowed  by  sign
substitution.
17. Eco concluded in his usual caustic tone: “And so Fabbrichesi’s essay has made an original
contribution to my understanding of my own ideas.” I  would like to point out here that my
contribution  to  the  Library  volume,  in  which  iconism  and  negative  realism  are  in  fact  not
connected, was written between 2010 and 2011, when Eco’s position on the matter had not been
fully clarified yet. Eco will spell out his position is a series of following papers: “Di un realismo
negativo” (2012), and “Su un realismo negativo” (2013). 
18. Or  at  the  phaneroscopic  level,  as  Peirce  says,  namely,  at  the  level  of  the  phaneron,  the
phenomenon of experience cf. CP 1.284, 304.
19. Eco continues: “At this moment we realize that our interpretations were good and we have
reached  some truth  even though such  a  certainty  is  mitigated  by  the  awareness  that  every
discovery of a truth is subject to the principle of fallibilism. Such an underlying notion of truth is
at  the basis  of  my idea,  as  I  have already said,  that  while  it  is  not  possible  to  say when an
interpretation is correct or is the only possible, it is always possible to say when it is untenable.”
(Ibid.)
20. It is worth noting that this is Spinoza’s position (the substance is potentia agendi,  Ethica I,
prop. 34), emphasized in Gilles Deleuze’s reading (Spinoza et le problème de l’expression, 1968), and
also Nietzsche’s position (On the Genealogy of Morals, 1998, Ch. I, 13): “There is no ‘being’ behind
the doing, acting, becoming. ‘The doer’ is merely invented after the fact – the act is everything.”
21. The text by Walter Ong to which I refer is Orality and Literacy (1982). I rely here on the version
often quoted by Carlo Sini, for instance in Ethics of Writing (2009: 18). 
22. This interpretation is put forth by Carlo Sini in several works, for instance Sini (2009, part II).
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23. In opposition to James, who stressed the empiricist, non-realist (in the Medieval sense) side
of the maxim, Peirce wrote: “It must be admitted in the first place that if pragmaticism really
made Doing the Be-all and the End-all of life, that would be its death. For to say that we live for
the mere sake of action, as action, regardless of the thought it carries out, would be to say that
there is no such thing as a rational purport.” (CP 5.429; see also 3.402, 428, 238, 453, 460).
24. Paolucci (2017a: 259 and n41). La propension de choses is the title of an interesting volume
written by the French sinologist François Jullien (1992), devoted to the subject of efficacy and
action in China, absolutely comparable in my view to the pragmatist tradition.
25. “By phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or any sense present to the
mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not.” (CP 1.284).
26. “Reality means a kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so it is a cognitionary character,
while existence means reaction with the environment, and so it is a dynamic character.” (CP 5.503;
original emphasis).
27. “The sense of acting and being acted upon, […] is our sense of the reality of things.” (Ibid.).
28. Cf. the etymology of the word phaneron: what is evident in its brightness.
29. See also CP 5.538: “Let’s use the word habit […] in which it denotes such a specialization,
original or acquired […] that he or it will behave, or always tend to behave, in a way describable
in  general  terms  upon  every  occasion  that  may  present  itself  of  a  generally  describable
character.”  See  also  the  definition of  pragmaticism in  Issues  of  Pragmaticism (EP2:  346):  “The
entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational
conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would
ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.”
30. See on this Brioschi (2015:  86-9).  The volume containing the essay by Brioschi (Su Peirce.
Edited by Bonfantini, Zingale, and Fabbrichesi) is the last text that Eco decided to publish in his
series “Il campo semiotico.” All the editors, including myself, were very grateful to Eco for this.
Moreover, the presentation of the book was one of Eco’s last public interventions. It is even more
important  –  in  light  of  the  reading developed in  the  present  paper  –  to  notice  that  in  that
occasion Eco expressed much appreciation for  Brioschi’s  essay  and for  her  interpretation of
Peirce’s realism. On these topics, see also Stango 2015 and Paolucci 2015.
31. We should not forget that the pragmatic maxim wants to suggest a new way to define and
ascertain the meanings of concepts: not according to the Socratic “What is it?,” but according to
the (Spinozian) point of view “What can be done with it in order to obtain knowledge of it?” The
earlier example of lithium is crucial here (CP 2.330).
ABSTRACTS
My intention in this paper is to contribute the debate on “realism” in order to raise a different
sort of question: not whether ‘reality’ exists or does not exist, but rather what effects does the
belief in this or that reality produce (as Peirce put it 150 years ago). I will turn to Eco’s later
thought, and to his support for a form of ‘negative’ realism, and try to demonstrate how his
appeal to Peirce’s distinction between Immediate and Dynamical Object is affected by a common-
sense  interpretation  of  what  ‘real’  amounts  to.  Peirce  in  fact  distinguished  between  the
“existence” of facts and their “reality.” The former implies a dynamic of blind force, a dynamical
reaction.  Yet,  “reality consists  in the future” (CP 8.284),  in the public  recognition of  what it
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always will be, or we hope will be, in the long run (Peirce uses the word “mellonization”). In Eco’s
work, though, the Being or the Real, seen as pure Something, is understood after the form of a
Thing, above all External, which simply says many ‘No’s.
Peirce’s pragmaticism leads us further on, concentrating on the concept of habit that is also
detectable in Eco’s analysis. We could say that Peirce distinguishes brute existence hic et nunc from
the persistence of habits. Acts and dispositions to act, and not facts (as opposed to interpretations)
appear as real; and it is in this respect that I think we can find a promising line of research for
better explaining Eco’s theory of realism.
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